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Last spring I attended the big, statewide Trump rally here at the Lane Events 
Center in Eugene. It looked like what you might expect in Oregon; a largely 
working-class white audience who responded to Trump when he talked about 
free trade battering Oregon’s economy, about job losses in the mills. They also 
cheered his anti-Clinton tirades, and joined the chant “Build the wall!”   
 Then last summer, I went to Cleveland for the Republican National 
Convention where I spoke to dozens of attendees. The longtime GOP members I 
interviewed would have been pleased to support any of the establishment 
conservatives on offer during the primaries. But when I asked questions about 
the party’s presumptive nominee, most of my respondents looked queasy. And 
then there were Trump loyalists –pugilistic, conspiratorial, often unabashedly 
racist outsiders exhilarated by their candidate.1  
  It is a common refrain that Trump drew on alienated white voters, many of 
them from outside of the GOP. And it is of course true that Trump’s margin of 
victory in the Electoral College came from those states along the lower rim of the 
Great Lakes where globalization has hammered industrial jobs the hardest.  
 The conditions wrought by 40 years of neoliberalism are central to the 
story. They have caused extraordinary economic and social dislocation across 
US society in what many scholars have called the second Gilded Age. But 
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politics don’t emerge directly from conditions. How people understand their 
interests is a product of politics, not the other way around.  
 So where did Trumpism come from? One clear story here is the legacy of 
white racial populism.  We can trace this lineage from George Wallace’s 
campaigns in 1964 and 1968 – which was absorbed into Nixon’s Silent Majority, 
and then emerged again in the figure of the Reagan Democrat in 1980 and 1984. 
 But as the Republican Party became more identified with the 
establishment, with financialization, corporate rule, and American imperial 
hegemony, the old white populist insurrection re-ignited. The central figure here 
is Pat Buchanan, who ran in the GOP primaries in 1992 and 1996 on a self-
consciously populist anti-free trade, anti-Wall Street, anti-immigrant, anti-
affirmative action, and anti-abortion platform.  
 “Pitchfork Pat” drew both cultural traditionalists and angry white workers 
(many Democrats and union members) into his “Buchanan Brigades” and 
opened up a divide in the Republican Party, garnering nearly 3 million votes in 
1992 and was thus offered a primetime spot at the convention for his now 
famous Culture War speech.   
 
 One of Buchanan’s closest advisors was a man named Samuel Francis. 
Francis was, as he described himself, “a man of the right, perhaps the far right”. 
He was a diehard racist, a nativist, and a nostalgic for the southern lost cause. 
Once an editor at the conservative Washington Times, Francis was fired for 
suggesting in a column that neither slavery nor racism were in any way immoral. 
He left there to edit the newsletter of the Council of Conservative Citizens, to 
work for the League of the South, and write for increasingly obscure publications 
of the far and racist right.  
 Francis, who died in relative obscurity in 2005 after spending the last 
years of his life writing a sprawling opus on the second floor of Robert E. Lee’s 
historic home, became an important figure for white nationalists in the alt-right 
when it emerged in the last few years, and you can see how his racist theorizing 
would galvanize Trumpism. 
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 But Francis’s story is more complicated. I saw him deliver a keynote 
address at a gathering back in 1994. This was not a Citizens Council meeting, 
nor even an event sponsored by a far right magazine like American 
Renaissance. It was at a conference on populism put on by the critical theory 
journal, Telos, at Cooper Union in New York City.  
 More on what he said there in a minute, but this, I think, gets to the heart 
of what is one of the left’s biggest challenges in regard to Trumpism. Francis, you 
see, was not simply a racist crackpot. He was a complex thinker who was able to 
put his finger on something true about neoliberalism and its ravages. He had 
been a mentee of James Burnham, the former Marxist radical and confidante of 
Trotsky who went on to become a leading figure in the American conservative 
movement in the 1950s and 60s, after writing a book called The Managerial 
Revolution: What is Happening in the World in 1941.2   
 Francis, like Burnham, saw a managerial “new class” as having become 
the dominant class in the 20th century, the central functionaries of both modern 
capitalism and the bureaucratic state, oppressing a broad working class. 
As he wrote in a 1990 essay called, “From Household to Nation: The Middle 
American Populism of Pat Buchanan,” “If the post-bourgeois middle class 
seriously wishes to avoid its own extinction, it will have to evolve a new group 
consciousness and a new identity independent of both the moribund bourgeois 
elite and the techno-bureaucracy of the global managerial order…. and it must 
aspire to form the core of a new political and cultural order in which it can assert 
its own hegemony.”3 
Francis saw promise in what sociologist Donald Warren called Middle American 
Radicals (or MARs) as holding the populist possibility of breaking out of this elite 
stranglehold on American society.4 
 
 Francis was strongly influenced by Machiavelli and Nietzsche,  and also 
by the Gramscian theory of hegemony. He was a close reader of the critical 
theory Telos, and particularly the writings of editor Paul Piccone, who was 
increasingly focused on what he called the” artificial negativity thesis.” Building 
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on Adorno’s notion of the totally administered society and Marcuse’s one-
dimensionality thesis, Piccone argued that capitalist rationality required forms of 
negation to recalibrate itself bureaucratically.  
 In the absence of any real negation, Piccone argued, capitalism produces 
it systemically through social movements, protests, etc. which never threaten the 
system, but rather make it more powerful, more efficient. In a society and state 
where genuine democratic sovereignty was increasingly eclipsed and market 
relations paramount, editors and writers at Telos looked to the eco-anarchism of 
Murray Bookchin, the western Marxism of Agnes Heller, communalism, 
traditionalism, Schmittian anti-liberalism, and perhaps most of all, populism as 
possible forms of political and cultural practice that could resist political 
domination and social alienation.5  Distinctions of left versus right fell away in the 
quest to find genuine, organic forms of practice and expression outside of 
capitalism and state power.  
 I think there are many serious problems with this analysis, but it reflected 
a moment of the emergence of George H.W. Bush’s “New World Order” and 
followed by that the free-trade promoting Clinton regime. Where and how to even 
think about enacting political freedom was not at all clear for these veterans of 
the New Left’s promise of participatory democracy. 
 As it drifted toward notions of organicity, Telos also became the major 
translator for English-speaking audiences of the European new right, the white 
French Algerian Alain de Benoit in particular.  The ideas of the European new 
right: regionalism, anti-immigration, and most of all ethnonationalism (either 
cultural or biological) – have been profoundly influential on the contemporary Alt 
Right.6  Indeed another strand of connection runs from regular Telos contributor 
and one-time Marcuse student, Paul Gottfried, to white nationalist, Richard 
Spencer, who claims him as a mentor.7  
 Telos foundered, lurched rightward and made itself available for racist 
purposes in great part because while the journals writers and editors were able to 
generate powerful analyses of capitalism and state formation, they did not 
theorize them in relation to either slavery and colonialism, or heteropatriarchy. 
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These could not be made legible as forms of resistance to systemic domination 
and hierarchy because they were not fundamental to an analysis of state and 
capital formation in the first place. 
 It was as if in the absence of these terms, opposition to neoliberalism 
would almost inevitably look toward some imagined forms of particularity. In a 
modern world that is founded on not only capitalism and the state, but white 
supremacy and bourgeois family as its supports, this almost inevitably meant a 
drift toward ethnonationalism and traditionalism. Thus Piccone’s romance of the 
northern Italian Lombard League, for example.  
 Back to Francis, what I remember most about his address at Cooper 
Union was his insistence that if his audience there wanted to embrace populism 
as an authentic, organic form of resistance, they had to embrace it all – including, 
he said by way of example – the anti-austerity riots aimed at Jews that broke out 
all over England in 1947.  The assembled Telos editors, writers, and readers 
shifted uncomfortably in their seats and chuckled in embarrassment, but none 
had an answer for Francis. 
 Just as left and right responses to neoliberalism became blurry at Telos, 
they did so in the Buchanan campaigns of that era as well. Future Socialist Party 
USA presidential candidate, Brian Moore, supported him in 1992. As Tom 
Carson of the left-leaning Village Voice told the candidate in 1996, "I've been 
waiting my whole life for someone running for president to talk about the Fortune 
500 as the enemy, and when I finally get my wish, it turns out to be you."8 
 I relate this odd history because I think it is instructive for the very 
precarious moment in which we now find ourselves.  Globally, there are two 
major responses to this era of vast inequality, or two off ramps from 
neoliberalism: one left, one right.    
 On the left there has been Die Linke in Germany, Syriza in Greece, 
Podemos in Spain, and various populisms in Bolivia, Ecuador, and other parts of 
Latin America, and Sandersism in the US. Most of these express some vision of 
social democracy, oppose many trade agreements, and financialized economies.  
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 On the right there is Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, Austria’s 
Freedom Party, the Jobbik Party in Hungary, Golden Dawn in Greece, the Brexit 
campaign in the UK, Trumpism here. These all also oppose free trade, 
financialization and bureaucrats making decisions about their lives in distant 
centers of power, but in doing so, they also express some admixture of racism, 
nativism, traditionalism, patriarchy, and authoritarianism. The current dominant 
right responses to the neoliberal order are unquestionably on the rise and are 
developing in complex symbiosis with forms of accelerationist, and extractivist 
capitalism that eschews the neoliberal international order and embraces instead 
a kind of Schmittian nationalism.  
 In this context, the current dominant responses on the left risk being 
entirely swamped, or short of that absorbing a  politics that consciously resists 
what some on the left call “identitarianism.” This is the tentative direction taken 
by, for instance, the social democratic Jacobin Magazine in the US, or Sahra 
Wagenknecht’s campaign in Germany’s Die Linke party to move it in a more anti-
refugee direction.  
 The gamble, for these parties and movements, is that by avoiding issues 
that divide the working class, or appealing to people on the basis of white racial 
or national identity - they have a fighting chance of building a left. This path leads 
not toward socialism (or even a more tentative defeat of Trumpism) but toward a 
politics that will be played out entirely on the landscape that the fascists are 
trying to create. 
 Buchanan was recently asked why Trump had fared so much better than 
he had in the 1990s. He replied: “What’s different today is that the returns are in, 
the results are known. Everyone sees clearly now the de-industrialization of 
America, the cost in blood and treasure from decade-long wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, and the pervasive presence of illegal immigrants. What I saw at the San 
Diego border 25 years ago, everyone sees now on cable TV. And not just a few 
communities but almost every community is experiencing the social impact.” This 
equivalential chain that Buchanan strove to forge a quarter-century ago from the 
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margins of the GOP is now is the common sense logic of the movement that won 
the 2016 presidential election.   
 We need a counterhegemonic, populist struggle that delinks those 
elements. We won’t defeat Trumpism unless we can connect war abroad to the 
ongoing, increasingly militarized war on people of color here. We must connect 
financialization to its costs not just on a failing Middle America, but on the way all 
communities have been failed, particularly the most vulnerable. The struggle 
against Trumpism must simultaneously take up on the neoliberal order that gave 
impetus for the Trumpian revolt, but also - finally – it  must put the fight against 
masculinized white supremacy at the center of our work.  
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